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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from a final Judgment dated January 2, 1997, of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Spanish Fork Department, in and for Utah County, State of Utah This case was 
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Complaint when Appellee has no standing to sue Appellant under the amended cause of action and 
without granting Appellant any relief for prevailing on the original issues? The court affords no 
deference to the trial court's findings in reviewing whether a party has standing. State v Taylor. 818 
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
II. Did the trial court err in signing the Order granting Motion for Leave to file Amended 
Complaint five (5) days before it was mailed to the court on March 15, 1996, and entering the same 
on June 26, 1996, without giving Appellant any notice that the same had been granted or entered? 
"Whether a party has reasonable notice is a factual determination that [the court] review[s] under a 
clearly erroneous standard." Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin.. 889 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct. App 1995) 
III. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment when 
Appellee admitted in its Amended Complaint and Motion to file the same, and in its discovery 
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responses, that Appellant did not owe the money prayed for in the Complaint, and in fact, had already 
paid such sum? A trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law which is 
reviewed de novo for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) (citing 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); Hunsakerv. State. 870 P.2d 893, 
896 (Utah 1993)). 
IV. Did the trial Court err in granting Appellee's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment 
when such Motion and supporting pleadings were not served on Appellant's counsel, when Appellee 
was not a party to any contract with the Appellant and received no assignment of any interest in the 
amount requested in the motion, and when the allegations of the supporting Memorandum were 
entirely unsupported by any evidence in the record before the Court? A trial court's grant of a 
motion for summary judgment is a matter of law which is reviewed de novo for correctness. White 
v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). 
V. Did the trial court err in signing and entering the Judgment on the same day it granted 
the Counter Motion for Summary Judgment and without giving Appellant's counsel any notice of the 
grant of the motion or opportunity to object thereto and without giving Appellant any notice of the 
existence of or execution of the Judgment, or opportunity to file an objection thereto? "Whether a 
party had reasonable notice is a factual determination that we review under a clearly erroneous 
standard." Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin.. 889 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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VI. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant due process of law? Because statutory and 
constitutional interpretation presents questions of law, the court will grant the trial court no deference 
in applying a correction of error standard of review. Cache County v. Property Tax Division. 922 
P.2d 758 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
The determinative statute, rule and constitutional provision is: 
Utah Const, art 1, §7. 
Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about September 23, 1995, Mr. Thomas Mower was served with a Ten Day Summons 
and a Complaint alleging that Mr. Mower incurred a debt to Mountain Fuel on May 30, 1991 in the 
amount of $475.60, and that Mr. Mower was liable for attorneys fees as provided in said contract * 
Mr Mower filed his Answer on October 3, 1995. 
Desiring to understand the basis of this claim, Mr. Mower, not having been a consumer of 
Mountain Fuel natural gas at any pertinent time, asked his counsel to send Plaintiff discovery requests 
*At this point, it is proper for Mr. Mower to cite to the record. However, the trial court 
judge has precluded the defendants from doing so. When preparing this brief, the trial court judge 
refused to allow Mr. Mower's counsel to check out the record on appeal even after the clerk of 
the Utah Court of Appeals instructed him to do so. See accompanying affidavit attached to 
Appendix A hereto. 
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on October 10, 1995, containing Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents. 
Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. ("Bonneville") served its Answer to Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents on Mr. Mower on November 9, 1995. In said responses, 
Bonneville indicated that the claim was based on a May 30, 1991 contract with Mr. Mower to allow 
a pipeline to be placed on his property. 
The contract did in fact call for a $475.60 payment, which was the basis for the lawsuit. 
However, the contract also reflected that Mr. Mower had paid said amount in full. Mr. Mower's 
counsel pointed out the same to Plaintiffs counsel, expecting the matter to be dismissed with an offer 
of reimbursement for Mr. Mower's attorney's fees, as provided for in the contract. 
Soon thereafter. Plaintiff moved the court to forget about the $475.60 cause of action which 
was the basis for the lawsuit, and then to amend the Complaint so Bonneville could bring a new and 
separate cause of action, without first confessing judgment and awarding attorney's fees on the 
original cause of action. 
The new cause of action suggests that Mr. Mower owes Bonneville $301.50 for some 
unevidenced failure to use natural gas. However, Mr. Mower has never been billed for any such 
$301.50 amount and has never been informed of the basis for any such debt. Furthermore, the only 
assignment that Bonneville received from Mountain Fuel was for the $475.60 amount, which Mr 
Mower paid. There is no assignment for the $301.50 amount. 
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Mr. Mower and his counsel were not served a number of important papers, and pleadings 
below, either by Bonneville or the court, which non-service greatly and detrimentally prejudiced Mr. 
Mower, to wit: 
1. The signed Order granting Motion For Leave to File Amended Complaint which was 
signed by the court on March 10, 1996, apparently five days before it was mailed to 
the court on March 15, 1996. Said Order was entered thereafter on June 26, 1996, 
without notice to Mr. Mower; 
2. Mr. Mower did not receive Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was dated December 6, 1996. There was no 
Mailing Certificate to accompany said memorandum either; 
3. Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 6, 1996, 
Supporting Affidavit dated December 11, 1996, Supporting Memorandum dated 
December 6, 1996 (which was date-stamped on December 12, 1996), and 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements which is undated. Appellee appears to 
have submitted a "catchall" Mailing Certificate for some of these documents attached 
to the Counter Motion for Summary Judgment falsely certifying to the Court that 
counsel mailed them to Defendant's Counsel on December 13, 1996, mailed after they 
were received by the Court; and, 
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4. Judgment signed on January 2, 1997, the same day of the lower Court's Ruling, and 
the same day Defendant's Opposing Memorandum was mailed. 
Without knowledge of the above-named pleadings and court orders, Mr. Mower's counsel 
prepared and submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment based on Mr. Mower's payment of the 
$475.60. Bonneville cross-moved for summary judgment for the amended claim of $301.50. Mr. 
Mower was not served with these pleadings. The Court granted Bonneville's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Mr. Mower's motion, despite Bonneville's admission that Mr. Mower had 
paid said $475.60. Mr. Mower was never served with a copy of the Judgment. 
Mr. Mower's counsel first became aware of the existence of the Order granting Motion 
for Leave to File Amended Complaint and the Judgment when counsel was preparing Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment. Furthermore, there exists no document or paper 
purporting that either was served on Mr. Mower's counsel or that counsel was aware of either. 
Mr. Mower's pleadings and posture below were based on his understanding that the Court failed 
to grant the Motion to Amend. The Judgment was not served on Mr. Mower's counsel prior to 
its submission to or entry by the Court. Mr. Mower had no opportunity to object to the form or 
content of the Judgment. 
Because of the lack of notice that the court had granted Bonneville's Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Complaint, Mr. Mower did not have the proper information to successfully oppose the 
6 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the trial court entered Judgment on 
January 2, 1997. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant Mr. Mower asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in no less than 
six instances in this litigation. First, the trial court abused its discretion by granting Defendant's 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Second, the trial court failed to give adequate 
notice to Mr. Mower that the Motion to file the Amended Complaint had been granted which 
prevented Mr. Mower from properly refuting the summary judgment motions. Third, the trial 
court erred by not granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the $475.60 cause of 
action after both parties had agreed that said amount had been paid in full. Fourth, the trial court 
erred by granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment when the Plaintiff below has no 
standing to sue Mr. Mower and the supporting pleadings were not served on Mr. Mower, which 
precluded him from introducing evidence in opposition that there were genuine issues of material 
fact. Fifth, the trial court erred by signing and entering the Counter Motion for Summary 
Judgment without giving Mr. Mower's counsel notice of the grant of the Motion or entry of the 
judgment with an opportunity to object thereto. Finally, the trial court violated Mr. Mower's due 
process rights by not giving Mr. Mower notice of said motions and judgments which precluded 
Mr. Mower from submitting evidence in support of his rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Mower asserts that the trial court committed at least six errors which were substantial, 
prejudicial, and adversely affected the outcome of the motions before the trial court. Based upon 
these errors, the Judgment should be reversed as a matter of law. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT. 
The trial court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. As outlined 
above, this Plaintiff was assigned a debt amount of $475.60, which amount constituted the basis 
for the original complaint. Mr. Mower proved he had paid such amount. No assignment for any 
other debt exists, and absent an assignment, this Plaintiff has no cause of action against Mr. 
Mower for a $301.50 debt. 
The court below granted Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint when on the face of the 
complaint, the Plaintiff had no cause of action against Mr. Mower. If Mountain Fuel had a cause 
of action against Mr. Mower for $301.50, it could have filed an action on its own behalf, or 
assigned its rights to Plaintiff. Mountain Fuel made no such assignment of any such cause of 
action, however, and Plaintiff had no standing to amend the complaint with the new cause of 
action. Therefore, the court below clearly erred in granting leave to file the Amended Complaint. 
In the alternative, if this court finds that the Plaintiff did in fact have standing to sue Mr. 
Mower, this court must reverse the trial court's grant of the Motion for Leave to Amend the 
Complaint because the trial court abused its discretion. "The decision to allow leave to amend a 
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complaint is discretionary with the trial court." Stratford v. Morgan. 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 
1994). However, a trial court cannot abuse its discretion by doing so. Girard v. Appleby. 660 
P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). To determine if a court properly may allow leave to amend a complaint, 
Utah Courts have used three factors for guidance: "(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the 
justification given by the movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding 
party." Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co,, 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court did 
not properly consider the latter two prongs in its analysis to grant the motion for leave to amend. 
First, the party moving for the court to grant the motion to amend must give the court a 
justification as to why the complaint should be amended. The record shows that Plaintiffs counsel 
claims to have inadvertently filed a claim for an amount that had already been paid to Plaintiffs 
assignor. See Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend; Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Upon realizing that it had filed a baseless lawsuit, Plaintiff tried to cover its mistake 
by alleging that another amount was due under the contract. A party's lack of preparedness and 
investigation of the facts cannot be a justification for the trial court to grant a motion for leave to 
amend a complaint. 
Furthermore, the trial court prejudiced Mr. Mower by allowing the Plaintiff to amend its 
complaint to the $301.50 cause of action. "In considering a motion to amend, the trial judge must 
decide 'whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
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adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare.'" Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746 P.2d 1189 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Berkins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). 
By amending the complaint, and then by not supplying notice to Mr. Mower of the amended 
action, Mr. Mower was not able to properly prepare arguments in opposition to the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, if Mr. Mower had received notice of the grant for leave to amend, Mr. 
Mower could not have successfully defended his rights because Plaintiff refused to answer in the 
underlying discovery the reasons for which the $301.50 claim was owed. See Plaintiffs Answer 
to Interrogatories and Requests for Productions of Documents Nos. 5 & 6. Because of the trial 
court's granting of the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, Mr. Mower did not 
have the opportunity to prepare and argue in opposition to the Counter Summary Judgment 
Motion. The trial court's actions are a clear example of an abuse of discretion by prejudicing Mr. 
Mower's rights. Therefore, the court must reverse the trial court's order on granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GIVING NOTICE TO MR. MOWER THAT IT 
HAD GRANTED THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Mr. Mower is entitled to certain rights under the laws of the State of Utah and the United 
States of America. One right that a person possesses is to receive notice of an action taken against 
him by a court of law. A failure for a court to give such notice is a violation of the Utah 
Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7; Plumb v. State of Utah. 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
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In this case, by granting the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, the court 
enabled the Plaintiff to try and collect a debt of $301.50, which was never demanded, billed, or 
requested in any form before the filing of the Motion to Amend, without giving notice to Mr. 
Mower. Once the court granted such motion to amend, Mr. Mower was entitled to know about 
that fact. See id. No notice was sent to Mr. Mower concerning such fact, and Defendant notes 
from the record that as late as May 22, 1996, (at least two months after the date of the Order) 
Plaintiff submitted its Notice to Submit for Decision the Motion to Amend that this Court 
purportedly signed on March 10, 1996. In other words, Bonneville had no notice of the grant of 
the motion at that late date either. 
Ill THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING MR. MOWER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER BOTH PARTIES AGREED THAT THE $475 60 DEBT 
HAD BEEN PAID IN FULL. 
The trial court erred by denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the $475 60 
cause of action. "Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law." Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 857 P.2d 263, 
265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "On appeal from a summary judgment, [the court] views the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences thereon in the light most favorable to the appellant." Kleinert v Kimball 
Elevator Co.. 854P.2d 1025 (UtahCt. App. 1993^ (quoting Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 
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(Utah 1991)). By reviewing the evidence in the record, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
should have been granted. 
Plaintiffs counsel admitted in filing its Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint that Mr. 
Mower had already paid the $475.60 which was the basis for this lawsuit. Because both parties agree 
that the $475.60 debt has been paid, no genuine issues of material fact exist. Bonneville made no 
motion to dismiss its claim and Mr. Mower did not stipulate thereto. Mr. Mower is entitled to his 
attorney's fees and costs of court on the $475.60 cause of action as provided under the subject 
contract. Therefore, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and award costs and attorney's fees to Mr. Mower. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS WERE NOT SERVED ON DEFENDANT 
AND THE EVIDENCE FOR WHICH THE COURT BASED ITS RULING IS NOT 
WITHIN THE RECORD. 
A discussion on the standard of review of a summary judgment motion is set forth above in 
Part III of this brief. Furthermore, a party must have adequate notice of an action by the court to 
satisfy due process requirements. See Utah Const, art 1, §7. By receiving timely and adequate notice, 
the party receives a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Cornish Town v. Roller. 798 P.2d 753, 
756 (Utah 1990). By applying that law to the facts of this case, Plaintiffs Counter Motion for 
Summary Judgment should have been denied. 
First, Mr. Mower was entitled to receive notice that a motion for summary judgment and 
supporting pleadings had been filed. Mr. Mower received no notice. This was prejudicial to his case 
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because Mr. Mower would have been able to submit evidence to the court that would have 
contradicted the assertions made by Plaintiff. This would have created genuine issues of material fact. 
For example, Plaintiff states in its Motion for Summary Judgment: "Despite repeated requests, 
billings and attempts to obtain payment, Defendant failed and refused to pay the amounts due and 
owing and this matter was assigned to Plaintiff." See Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Mr. Mower would have been able to refute this assertion by submitting evidence that 
Plaintiff did not repeatedly request the $301.50 payment, that Mr. Mower did not have any 
information of what constituted the $301.50 debt and that he did not owe this debt, and that Plaintiff 
had not been assigned the $301.50 debt. This would have refuted Plaintiffs allegations and there 
would have been genuine issues of material fact. However, Bonneville and the trial court deprived 
Mr. Mower of this right by not notifying him of all of the court action. Therefore, the court must 
reverse the trial court's grant of Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING AND ENTERING THE JUDGMENT ON 
THE SAME DAY IT GRANTED THE COUNTER MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND WITHOUT GIVING MR. MOWER'S COUNSEL ANY NOTICE OF 
THE GRANT OF THE MOTION OR AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT THERETO, AND 
WITHOUT GIVING ANY NOTICE TO MR. MOWER OF THE EXISTENCE OF OR 
EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT. 
Defendant was entitled to receive a copy of the proposed Judgment before it was submitted 
to or signed by the Court pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration. The code 
states in pertinent part: 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the 
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within five days after service. 
Mr. Mower was given no opportunity to object thereto, or to raise any of the procedural 
defects or anomalies present in the grant of Plaintiffs motion. Mr. Mower would know nothing 
about the existence of the Judgment but for a late mailed Notice of Judgment, dated January 13, 
1997, certified mailed on January 15, 1997, metered on January 16, 1997, and received by Mr. 
Mower's counsel on January 21, 1997. Because Mr. Mower was denied his legal rights to object 
to or oppose the order of the lower court, this court should reverse the trial court's order and 
judgment. 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED MR. MOWER'S DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The entire tenor of this action has been one of denial of Mr. Mower's basic procedural and 
notification rights under the laws and customs of the Courts of this State. See Utah Const, art. 
1, §7; Plumhv. State of Utah. 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990); Cornish Town v. Roller. 798 P.2d 
753, 756 (Utah 1990); Nelson v. Jacohsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Mr. Mower did 
not timely receive notice of specific allegations about him that were before the court. In addition, 
he did not have notice of the Judgment with costs and attorney's fees entered against him for a 
debt for which he was never billed and for which a demand for payment was never made. Said 
Judgment has been rendered to an entity that was not a party to any contract with Mr. Mower by 
any operation of law, including by an assignment of the debt, and that has no standing to sue Mr. 
Mower. 
Moreover, the signing of the Judgment simultaneously with the Ruling of the Court, with 
no or little consideration of Mr. Mower's arguments which were only signed and served that same 
day, and no notice or opportunity to respond to the proposed Judgment as provided by law was 
improper. Furthermore, when preparing this appellate brief, the trial court again denied Mr. 
Mower's rights by not allowing his counsel to check out the record on appeal. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
Orders and Judgment entered by the Fourth District Court and enter judgment for Mr. Mower 
and against Bonneville on both Motions for Summary Judgment, and award Mr. Mower his 
costs of court, costs on appeal, and attorney's fees below on appeal. 
Dated this 19th day of June, 1997. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT in Appeal No. 970102-CA were mailed, U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid to the following. 
WILFORD N. HANSEN JR. #1352 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
2970 South Main Street, #202B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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AFFIDAVIT OF ANGELA HOWELL 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN BACKLUND, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I, Angela Howell, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am a legal assistant to counsel for Appellant herein. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
Affidavit of Angela Howell - Page 1 
3. On the morning of June 19, 1997, I telephoned the Spanish Fork Courthouse 
and spoke with a woman named Linda. I explained to her that we needed to have the above-
entitled record released so that Mr. Thompson could prepare the brief in this case. Linda 
indicated to me that the record could not be released. She explained that the only way that we 
could get the record would be to have their file copied at a cost of .25 cents per page. 
4. I relayed this information to Mr. Thompson. He said he was under the 
impression that the Court released the record and the attorneys did not have to pay for copying 
fees. He asked me to call the Court of Appeals to find out if that was the proper procedure. 
5. On that same day, I telephoned the Court of Appeals and spoke to a Cindy. I 
explained the situation to Cindy. She went to check with her supervisor and then came back to 
the phone. She said that usually the record is just to be released to the attorney, without any 
fees being paid. She explained that they were not in the business of calling Courts and telling 
them how to run their offices. She told me to call back the Spanish Fork Court and explain 
what she had said and maybe they would release the file. She indicated that if that did not 
work I could call her back and she would see what else could be done. 
6. I telephoned the Spanish Fork Court again. I spoke with Linda again and 
explained what the Court of Appeals had said. She said that she would call Cindy at the Court 
of Appeals and then talk to Judge Backlund and get back to me. 
7. On June 19, 1997, at 11:55 p.m., Linda from the Spanish Fork Court called me 
back. She said that she had called the Court of Appeals and she had given that information to 
Judge Backlund. She said, "The Judge has refused to release the file". I asked if we needed to 
pay .25 cents per page. She said, "Yes, I am sorry". She indicated that we already have a lot 
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of the documents, and that we could bring what we had to the Court and she would make 
copies of anything that we did not have. 
8. I relayed this information to Mr. Thompson and he requested that I prepare an 
affidavit regarding the phone calls. 
DATED this P 3 ~day of June, 1997. 
// [lAU\tU> fhnJjJJ 
ANGELA (HOWELL 
Affiant v 
Subscribed and sworn to me by Angela Howell, who is personally known to me to be 
the person who signed the foregoing document, in my presence, on this A±5 " day of June, 
1997. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing Affidavit of Angela Howell to be served on 
the Defendant by mailing a true copy thereof by first-class United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, on this " j . ; ^ day of June, 1997, to the following: 
Wilford N Hansen, Jr. 
1172 East Highway 6, #7 
Payson, Utah 84651 
) 
v^  ?L^ 
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